In the paper we define a notion of quantum resistant ((ǫ, δ)-resistant) hash function which combine together a notion of pre-image (one-way) resistance (ǫ-resistance) property we define in the paper and the notion of collision resistance (δ-resistance) properties.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography describes the use of quantum mechanical effects (a) to break cryptographic systems and (b) to perform cryptographic tasks. Quantum factoring algorithm and quantum algorithm for finding discrete logarithm are famous results that belong for the first direction. Quantum key distribution, quantum digital signature schemes constructions belong to the second direction of quantum cryptography.
Gottesman and Chuang proposed in 2001 a quantum digital signature protocol [1] which is based on quantum one-way function. This is also the case for other protocols (see for example [2] ). In [3, 4] we explicitly defined a notion of quantum hashing as a generalization of classical hashing and presented examples of quantum hash functions. It appeared that Gottesman-Chuang quantum signature schemes are based on functions which are actually quantum hash functions. Those functions have "unconditionally oneway" property based on Holevo Theorem [5] . More information on the role of quantum hashing for the post quantum cryptography, possible application of quantum hashing for quantum signature protocols, and technological expectations for realization of quantum signature schemes are presented in [6] .
Recall that in the classical setting a cryptographic hash function h should have the following three properties [7] . (1) Pre-image resistance: Given h(x), it should be difficult to find x, that is, these hash functions are one-way functions. (2) Second preimage resistance: Given x 1 , it should be difficult to find an x 2 , such that h(x 1 ) = h(x 2 ). (3) Collision resistance: It should be difficult to find any pair of distinct x 1 , x 2 , such that h(x 1 ) = h(x 2 ). Note, that there are no one-way functions that are known to be provably more difficult to invert than to compute, the security of cryptographic hash functions is "computationally conditional".
Informally speaking, a quantum hash function ψ [3, 4] is a function that maps words (over an alphabet Σ) of length k to a quantum pure states of s-qubits (ψ :
⊗s ) and has the following properties:
1. Function ψ must be one-way resistant. In quantum case this means that k > s.
2. Function ψ must be collision resistant. In quantum case this means that for different words w, w ′ states |ψ(w) , |ψ(w ′ ) must be "almost orthogonal" (δ-orthogonal) [4] .
Quantum collision resistance property cover both second pre-image resistance and collision resistance properties for the quantum setting
In papers [8, 9] we considered a quantum Branching Program as a computational model which, we believe, is adequate quantum technological model for presenting a quantum communication protocols and quantum cryptographic signature schemes based on hashing.
Our contribution. In the paper we define a notion of (ǫ, δ)-hash function where values ǫ and δ are numerical characteristics of the above two properties: (i) one-way resistance and (ii) collision resistance properties. The notion of the (ǫ, δ)-hash function is an explicit generalization of our constructions [3, 4] . We show that in the quantum setting the one-way resistance property and collision resistance property are correlated: the "more" a quantum function is one-way resistant the "less" it is collision resistant and vice versa. We present a quantum hash function which is "balanced" one-way resistant and collision resistant. In addition we present more discussion that supports the idea of quantum hashing from our papers. Note, that a realization of the balanced quantum hash function requires the high degree of entanglement between the qubits which makes such a state very difficult (or impossible) to create with current technology.
We present quantum "balanced" hashing constructions based on "phase transformation" presentation [10] instead of "amplitude transformation" [4] . The phase transformation is required to map quantum hash states into a sequence of coherent states.
Note, that quantum signature protocols using coherent states can be practically implemented by now day technology that use only a sequence of coherent states, linear optics operations, and measurements with single-photon threshold detectors. See [11, 12, 7] for more information and citations.
Quantum (ǫ, δ)-Resistant Hash Function
Recall that mathematically a qubit is described as a unit vector in the two-dimensional Hilbert complex space H 2 . Let s ≥ 1. Let (H 2 ) ⊗s be the 2 s -dimensional Hilbert space, describing the states of s qubits. For an integer j ∈ {0, . . . , 2 s − 1} let σ = σ 1 . . . σ s be a binary presentation of j. We use (as usual) notations |j and |σ to denote quantum state |σ 1 · · · |σ s = |σ 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |σ s .
We let q to be a prime power and F q be a finite field of order q. Let Σ k be a set of words of length k over a finite alphabet Σ. Let X be a finite set. In the paper we let X = Σ k , or X = F q . For K = |X| and integer s ≥ 1 we define a (K; s) classical-quantum function (or just quantum function) to be a unitary transformation (determined by an element w ∈ X) of the initial state |ψ 0 ∈ (H 2 ) ⊗s to a quantum state |ψ(w) ∈ (H 2 )
where U(w) is a unitary matrix. We let |ψ 0 = |0 in the paper and use (for short) the following notation (instead the above)
One-way Resistant Function.
We present the following definition of quantum ǫ-resistant one-way function. Let "information extracting" mechanism M be a function M : (H 2 ) ⊗s → X. Informally speaking mechanism M makes some measurement to state |ψ ∈ (H 2 ) ⊗s and decode the result of measurement to X.
⊗s be a quantum function. Let Y is any random variable over X obtained by some mechanism M making measurement to the encoding ψ of X and decoding the result of measurement to X. Let ǫ > 0. We call a quantum function ψ a one-way ǫ-resistant function if for any mechanism M, the probability
For the cryptographic purposes it is natural to expect (and we do this in the rest of the paper) that random variable X is uniformly distributed.
A quantum state of s ≥ 1 qubits can "carry" an infinite amount of information. On the other hand, fundamental result of quantum informatics known as Holevo's Theorem [5] states that a quantum measurement can only give s bits of information about the state. We will use here the following particular version [13] of Holevo's Theorem. Property 2.1 (Holevo-Nayak) Let X be random variable uniformly distributed over a k bit binary words {0,
⊗s be an (2 k ; s) quantum function. Let Y be a random variable over X obtained by some mechanism M making some measurement of the encoding ψ of X and decoding the result of measurement to {0, 1}
k . Then our probability of correct decoding is given by
Collision Resistant Function
The following definition was presented in [4] .
⊗s a collision δ-resistant function if for any pair w, w ′ of different elements,
Testing Equality. What one needs for quantum digital signature schemes realization is an equality testing procedure for quantum hashes |ψ(v) and |ψ(w) in order to compare classical messages v and w; see for example [1] . The SWAP-test is the known quantum test for the equality of two unknown quantum states |ψ and |ψ ′ (see [1, 3] for more information).
We denote P r swap [v = w] a probability that the SWAP-test having quantum hashes |ψ(v) and |ψ(w) outputs the result "v = w" (outputs the result "|ψ(v) = |ψ(w) "). 
Proof. From the description of SWAP-test it follows that
The next test for equality was first mentioned in [1] . We call this test a REVERSEtest [3] . REVERSE-test was proposed to check if a quantum state |ψ is a hash of an element v. Essentially the test applies the procedure that inverts the creation of a quantum hash, i.e. it "uncomputes" the hash to the initial state.
Formally, let for element w the procedure of quantum hashing be given by unitary transformation U(w), applied to initial state |φ 0 . Usually we let |φ 0 = |0 , i.e. |ψ(w) = U(w)
Proof. Using the property that unitary transformation keeps scalar product we have that
One-way Resistance and Collision Resistance
The above two definitions and considerations lead to the following formalization of the quantum cryptographic (one-way and collision resistant) function Definition 2.3 Let K = |X| and s ≥ 1. Let ǫ > 0 and δ > 0. We call a function ψ : X → (H 2 ) ⊗s a quantum (ǫ, δ)-Resistant (K; s)-hash function iff ψ is a one-way ǫ-resistant and is a collision δ-resistant function.
We present below the following two examples to demonstrate how one-way ǫ-resistance and collision δ-resistance are correlated. The first example was presented in [14] in terms of quantum automata.
Example 2.1 Let us encode numbers v from {0, . . . , 2 k −1} by a single qubit as follows:
Extracting information from |ψ by measuring |ψ with respect to the basis {|0 , |1 } gives the following result. The function ψ is one-way 1 2 k -resistant (see Property 2.1) and collision cos π/2 k−1 -resistant. According to the properties 2.1 and 2.3 the function ψ has good one-way property, but has bad resistance property for a large k.
Example 2.2
We consider a number v ∈ {0, . . . , 2 k − 1} to be also a binary word v ∈ {0, 1} k . Let v = σ 1 . . . σ k . We encode v by k qubits:
Extracting information from |ψ by measuring |ψ with respect to the basis {|0 . . . 0 , . . . , |1 . . . 1 } gives the following result. The function ψ is one-way 1-resistant and collision 0-resistant. So, in contrary to the Example 2.1 the encoding ψ from the Example 2.2 is collision free, that is, for different words v and w quantum states |ψ(v) and |ψ(v) are orthogonal and therefore reliably distinguished; but we loose the one-way property: ψ is easily invertible.
The following result [4] shows that quantum collision δ-resistant (K; s) function needs at least log log K − c(δ) qubits.
Property 2.4 ([4])
Properties 2.4 and 2.1 provide a basis for building a "balanced" one-way ǫ-resistance and collision δ-resistance properties. That is, roughly speaking, if we need to hash elements w from a domain X with |X| = K and if one can build for a δ > 0 a collision δ-resistant (K; s) hash function ψ with s ≈ log log K − c(δ) qubits then the function f will be a one-way ǫ-resistant with ǫ ≈ (log K/K).
"Balanced" Quantum Hash Functions Constructions
We start by recalling some definitions, notations, and facts from [15] . For a field F q , the discrete Fourier transform of a set B ⊆ F q is the function
By B δ,q we denote δ-good subset of F q . For a field F q , let B ⊆ F q . For every b ∈ B and w ∈ F q , define a function h b : F q → F q and a family H B by the rule
We denote by H δ,q the above set of functions and call H δ,q δ-good if B = B δ,q is δ-good.
Theorem 3.1 Let δ > 0 and q be a prime power. Let H δ,q = {h 1 , . . . , h T } be δ-good. Then for s = log T a function
is a collision δ-resistant (q; s) quantum hash function.
Proof. Note, that the proof of this theorem in terms of amplitude transformation was presented in [3] . The proof presented below is in terms of phase transformation [10] . Let B δ,q = {b 1 , . . . , b T } determines δ-good family H δ,q . We let H = H δ,q in the proof. We consider the following quantum function ψ H :
The quantum state |ψ H (w) composed from s qubits. To show that ψ H is collision δ-resistant (q; s) quantum hash function we prove the collision δ-resistance of ψ H . Consider a pair w, w ′ of different elements from F q and their inner product ψ H (w) | ψ H (w ′ ) . Recall that the inner product of two complex vectors |α = (α 1 , . . . , α T ) and |β = (β 1 , . . . , β T ) is the sum α | β = j α jβj whereβ j is the complex conjugate of β j . Using the fact that the conjugate of e iφ is e −iφ , and the fact that B δ,q is δ-good we have that
• In [4] we defined a set of discrete functions a quantum hash generator if it allow to built a quantum hash function.
In the context of Theorem 3.1 the set H δ,q is a collision δ-resistant hash generator: it generates the quantum hash function ψ H δ,q .
Optimality of the hashing scheme. The following facts were presented in [15] . Let δ = δ(q) be any function tending to zero as q grows to infinity. Then there exists δ-good set B δ,q with |B δ,q | = (log q/δ(q)) O (1) . Several optimal (in the sense of the above lower bound) explicit constructions of δ-good sets B δ,q were presented by different authors. For those constructions
The following statement summarize Theorem 3.1 and the above consideration.
Corollary 3.1 Let q be a prime power, T (q) = (log q) O(1) , and s = log T (q). Let ǫ(q) = T (q)/q and δ(q) = 1/T (q). Let H δ,q be δ(q)-good set of functions with |H δ,q | = T (q). Then
2. The number s of qubits is good in the sense of the lower bound of Property 2.4 which gives the following lower bound s ≥ log log q − log log 1 + 2/δ − 1.
We refer to the paper [3] for more information on practical construction of the set H δ,q and the Numerical results from genetic algorithm for H δ,q construction.
Balanced Quantum Hash Function Families.
In [4] we offered design, which allows to build a large amount of different quantum hash functions. The construction is based on composition of classical ǫ-universal hash family [16] and a given family H δ,q a quantum hash generator. A resulting family of functions is a new quantum hash generator. In particular, we present a quantum hash generator G RS based on Reed-Solomon code.
Let q be a prime power, let k ≤ n ≤ q, let F q be a finite field. A Reed-Solomon code (for short RS-code) is a linear code
Pick n distinct elements (evaluation points) A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } of F q . A common special case is n = q − 1 with the set of evaluating points being A = F q \{0}. To encode word w we evaluate P w (x) on over all n elements a ∈ A C RS (w) = (P w (a 1 ) . . . P w (a n )).
We define family F RS = {f a : a ∈ A} based on RS-code C RS as follows. For a ∈ A define f a : (F q ) k → F q by the rule f a (w) = P w (a). Let H δ,q = {h 1 , . . . , h T } be a δ-good set of functions, satisfying Corollary 3.1. Composition
⊗s for a word w ∈ (F q ) k by the rule
here |lj denotes a basis quantum state, where lj is treated as a concatenation of the binary representations of l and j.
Property 3.1 Let q be a prime power and let 2 ≤ k < n ≤ q. Then for arbitrary δ ∈ (0, 1) the function ψ G RS is an (ǫ, ∆)-resistant (q k ; s) quantum hash function, where ǫ ≤ (q log q)/q k , ∆ ≤ k−1 n + δ, and s ≤ log (q log q) + 2 log 1/δ + 4.
Let c > 1. If we select n = ck, then ∆ < 1/c + δ and according to Theorem 2.4 there exist constants c 1 (∆), c 2 (∆) such that log (q log q) − c 1 (∆) ≤ s ≤ log (q log q) + c 2 (∆). Thus, Reed Solomon codes provide balanced parameters for resistance values ǫ, ∆ and for a number s of qubits for hash function ψ RS .
Presenting Quantum Hash States via Coherent States
Written in the form given in (2) and (3), the hash states ψ H δ,q (w) ∈ (H 2 ) ⊗s , w ∈ F q , and |ψ RS (w) ∈ (H 2 ) ⊗s , w ∈ (F q ) k , need high degree of entanglement between s qubits which is hard for the current technology. Papers [11, 12, 7] consider the idea of presenting quantum fingerprinting states via coherent states and developed signature constructions based on such coherent states.
Following idea from [11, 12] , we map the hash state ψ H δ,q (w) ∈ (H 2 ) ⊗s for w ∈ F q to a coherent state as follows. For short we let H δ,q = H in the rest of the section. Let T = 2 s . First, we define hash mode (H-hash mode) a H,w as
where b j ∈ {b 1 , . . . , b T } is the annihilation operator of the jth optical mode. Hash state is a single-photon state in the hash mode: |ψ H (w) = a H,w |0 . Next, we define coherent hash state as |α, ψ H (w) = D H,w (α)|0 , with parameter α,
where D H,w (α) = exp αa † H,w − α * a H,w is the displacement operator. According to [12] we have that the state |ψ H (w) is mapped to |α, ψ H (w) : Similarly one can map the hash state |ψ RS (w) ∈ (H 2 ) ⊗s with w ∈ (F q ) k to a coherent state.
In the next paper we will present a variants of quantum signature schemes based on quantum hash functions different from quantum fingerprinting function.
